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PROSECUTORS'
PEREMPTORY

CHALLENGES
Professor
Richard Friedman's article advocating the
elimination of the prosecution's peremptory challenges. Based on our extensive
practical familiarity with the topic, we do
not think that Friedman's proposal is a
desirable change in the law.
We believe that Friedman has seriously overestimated the litigative costs of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
while he has seriously underestimated
the litigative and other significant costs of
abolishing the government's
peremptories. He has misinterpreted the
historical record, and as a result, he has
proposed an idea that is radical and
unjust, and that invites mischief.
As we understand Friedman's position, his justification for eliminating the
prosecution's peremptories is that the
mess created by Batson has made the
retention of those peremptories expensive in terms of extra litigation. Indeed,
Friedman claims that Batson has made
prosecutors' peremptories a "frightfully
expensive procedural nightmare" that
very often threatens to append a minicase of discrimination onto the criminal
trial. We agree that Batson has made a
conceptual mess of what was once a
straightforward rule of procedure.
However, based on our own practical
experience, our knowledge of cases other
than our own in the Eastern District of
Michigan, and our contact with other
federal prosecutors around the country,
we strongly disagree with Friedman's
assessment of the actual litigative cost of
the decision.
WE READ WITH INTEREST

In the vast majority of cases, the
question of improperly exercised
peremptories does not even arise, and
accordingly, there is no litigative cost.
When it does arise, most Batson claims
are dismissed by the district court
immediately, because the defense fails to
establish a prima facie basis for believing
that any improper challenge has been
exercised. In these cases, the only
litigative cost is the few seconds or
minutes it takes for the court to hear and
deny the defense motion.
This is not to say that Batson hearings
are never held. In our experience, district
courts are very sensitive to the issue of
discrimination in jury selection. Because
of this sensitivity, many Batson hearings
take place even though one could not
fairly say that a prima facie case of
discrimination has been established, on
the apparent theory that the district court
is better off being safe with a hearing
than being sorry with a reversal on the
prima facie issue. The appropriate
hearing is also held, of course, in any
cases in which a prima facie violation is
really established.
However , even in these cases and even
with this degree of judicial caution, the
actual litigative costs have proven to be
minimal. Typically, Batson hearings are a
five- to 15-minute interlude during the
jury selection process. The government
explains its reasons for excusing particular jurors, those reasons are almost
always deemed to be neutral, and the
most common result is that the Batson
claim is denied . We have not checked
court records so we cannot say categorically that a court in this district has never
found a Batson concern to be substantiated, but if it has happened, it is extremely rare. Further, if such a case
occurs, the remedy is to restart the jury
selection process, before the tremendous
Continued on page 46
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Lynn A. Helland, Sheldon N.
Light and William J. Richards, all
experienced federal trial attorneys,
wrote this detailed response to
Professor Richard Friedman's
LQN article proposing the
elimination of peremptory
challenges for the prosecution
(Vol. 36 No. 2, 1993). Helland,
J.D. '80, and Light have both been
trial attorneys in the U.S.
Attorney's Office in the Eastern
District of Michigan for 11 years.
Richards, J.D. '72, has been a trial
attorney for the past 19 years,
including eight as an assistant U.S.
attorney and 10 in private
practice. All are currently a part of
the unit in the U.S. Attorney's
Office that investigates and
prosecutes public corruption and
complex financial crimes. The
views they express below are their
own, and not necessarily those of
the Department of Justice.
Friedman's reply follows.

ASSYMETRICAL
PEREMPTORIES
DEFENDED
I AM NOT SURPRISED that three prosecutors - even such able and thoughtful
advocates as Messrs. Helland, Light, and
Richards - regard as distasteful to the
point of abhorrence my proposal that
peremptory challenges be eliminated for
the prosecution but retained for the
defense. For that matter, I am equally
unsurprised that defense counsel seem to
think this is a great idea. And perhaps the
biggest non-surprise is that I adhere to
my view.
The prosecutors do not disagree with
me that peremptories for the defense
ought to be retained; our debate is
whether they ought to be retained for the
prosecution. I concede the prosecutors'
point that Batson has not yet made the
administrative burden of prosecutorial
peremptories intolerable. I suspect,
though, that the prosecutors would not
belittle that burden if they practiced in
other jurisdictions, such as in the Deep
South, where - perhaps for a combination of reasons of history, demography,
procedure, and personnel - the administrative burden has been far greater than
in Michigan federal court, and where
extensive Batson hearings and reversals
have been far more common.
Even in their own court, the prosecutors can find an excellent example of how
probing an investigation a careful judge

may have to conduct to follow Batson
conscientiously. In Echlin v. LeCureux,
800 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Mich. 1992),
Judge Avern Cohn held six days of
hearings before granting habeas corpus
on the ground that a state prosecutor had
discriminatorily exercised peremptories.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, 995 F.2d
1344 (1993), but only by using a rather
dubious avoidance mechanism denying the petitioners standing on the
ground that Powers v."'Ohio, one of the
progeny of Batson, created a "new rule"
and could not be applied retroactively.
Echlin is not atypical. Many courts
have limited the burden imposed by
Batson by doing their best to avoid the
case. Some use the same approach as in
Echlin. More commonly, courts avoid
difficulty by according extremely hospitable treatment to the reasons proffered
by counsel, particularly by prosecutors,
for exercising their peremptories. Some
of these reasons - "It wasn't that the
juror is Hispanic; it was that she speaks
Spanish and so would listen to the actual
testimony rather than to the transcript"
- should not pass the "straight face" test.
And so I have difficulty with the idea
that the rule of Batson creates a "conceptual mess" but not a practical mess. There
are doctrines on which this "tough in
theory, easy in practice" type of argument
might have some force - doctrines for
which the difficult conceptual issues arise
only occasionally, out on the fringes
where law professors love to roam. Batson
is different. Take, as a straightforward
example, a criminal case with a black
defendant. Any time the prosecutor
peremptorily challenges a black juror, a
potential Batson issue arises. How can we
be satisfied that race did not enter into

the decision? By offering peremptories,
we invite prosecutors to indulge their
hunches as to how a potential juror will
likely behave. But then we tell them that
they must put out of mind one of the
most critical facts about that person, one
that may critically affect her perspective
on the world and the relationship of the
state to the individual. This makes the
exercise of peremptories, as well as the
doctrine governing them, incoherent.
Aside from race, gender and religion
are also crucial facts that a party predicting a juror's attitudes in a given case may
well want to know. Does Batson apply to
these factors? If the answer is yes - the
answer I expect the Court will give, with
respect to gender, in the pending case of
].E.B. v. T.B. - the problem of incoherence will be extended and aggravated.
But a negative answer - the answer
given by the Alabama courts inj.E.B. and,
with respect to religion, by several state
courts - is even more troublesome: It is
hard to look benignly on blatant sex or
religious discrimination in a context that
the Court has actively sought to rid of
racial discrimination.
Perhaps the courts will continue in
large part to avoid the consequences of
this incoherence by turning their eyes
away from violations of Batson principles.
We ought to be suspicious of a rule when
one argument for it is that it is widely
ignored.
These difficulties would all be tolerable if there were any compelling need to
allow prosecutors to exercise peremptory
challenges. I do not believe there is.
Wisely, my prosecutorial critics do not
appear to argue strongly that prosecutorial
peremptories are necessary to prevent
inaccurate pro-defendant verdicts.
Rather, they emphasize the harm that an
outlier, perhaps an irrational juror, might
do by causing a hung jury.
I agree that this is a problem that must
be addressed. But relying on the prosecutor to address the problem, and on a
peremptory basis no less, is the wrong
Continued on page 4 7
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expenses of a trial have been incurred.
We are not aware that any judges in this
district have granted a new trial after
conviction because of a Batson issue.
Because Batson claims are usually
groundless, and because of the judicial
caution summarized above, they are
rarely a significant issue on appeal.
Although the case law is confused, it is
clear enough to permit the parties to
address virtually all real-life Batson issues
with a minimum of effort. Further, the
judicial confusion that has occurred as
the courts search for principles in the
Batson area has not resulted in a significant number of reversals. In fact, in our
collective recollection, not a single
conviction has been reversed in this
district because of Batson. For these
reasons, while we find Batson to be a
minor irritant and conceptually difficult,
it has by no means created the expensive
procedural nightmare Friedman suggests.
On the other hand, we think that
Friedman has seriously understated the
costs of abolishing the prosecution's
peremptory. He notes, more or less in
passing, that the inclusion of a few more
biased jurors is more likely to cause a
hung jury than to render a verdict
inaccurate. In fact, we see this as an
immense cost of his proposal.
In this district, it is not uncommon for
trials to last several weeks or months.
The financial costs associated with
retrying such a case, including witness
and juror expenses and court and
attorney time, are tremendous. Other
significant costs include serious inconvenience to witnesses and victims, who also
have rights, after all. We have no doubt
that the number of hung juries that
would result from abolishing the
prosecution's peremptories would be
substantial - and substantially higher
than the insignificant number of retrials
that result from confusion surrounding

Batson.
Most often, a hung jury is not the
result of a close factual question. Criminal jury verdicts, whether for conviction
or acquittal, must be unanimous. Hung
juries most commonly are the result of
one or two jurors refusing to deliberate
46
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or adopting an irrational view that is not
supported by the evidence. A significant
value of peremptories is that they permit
us to act on our judgment that a particular juror is not up to the task of participating fully and rationally in deliberations.
This is not an idle concern. Many
people who qualify for jury service are
poor decision-makers - a fact that might
not be obvious unless one has participated in a number of trials. However,
there is rarely a basis for excusing such
jurors for cause. Typically, each juror is
in the selection "spotlight" for only
seconds or a few minutes. Even if the
parties had ample time to study each
juror and could adequately articulate
why a particular juror appears problematic, it is not apparent that our subjective
evaluation that a juror is a poor decision
maker, no matter how accurate, is a basis
for a successful challenge for cause.
The defense has no motive to remove
such "fringe" juror~. The defense often
considers a hung jury to be a victory. A
mistrial improves the defendant's bargaining position, particularly in a complex or lengthy case. Indeed, especially in
some complex cases, a hung jury may
result in a complete victory for the
defense. In our experience it is not
uncommon for the defense to try to hang
a jury, simply because it improves the
defendant's position so greatly. It is the
rare prosecutor who has not witnessed
the glee of a defense attorney who
perceived that the government has
permitted a "loose cannon" juror to
remain on the jury.
The most useful purpose of the
government's peremptory is therefore to
remove those fringe jurors who do not
appear to be able to deliberate meaning-

fully with fellow jurors, and it is the only
means with which to accomplish this
important goal. If the government lost
that ability, there would be a large
increase in hung juries, and this increase
in litigative cost truly would be "frightfully expensive."
Aside from the costs involved, we also
do not agree that the other considerations
Friedman cites make the case for eliminating government peremptories. He is
not persuasive when he argues that his
proposed asymmetry is somehow
permissible because other asymmetries
already exist in the criminal justice
system. The existence of some asymmetry
in the system is hardly a justification for
more. Furthermore, almost every existing
asymmetry is the necessary result of some
specific protection for defendants, or the
logical result of the different positions in
which government and defendant find
themselves at trial. 1
For example, Friedman's most prominent example of an existing asymmetry is
the requirement that the government
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is not clear to us that this even is an
asymmetry. Rather, it reflects the standard practice that the burden of proof is
placed on the moving party, while the
level of proof in criminal cases is
weighted to reflect society's view that we
would rather wrongfully free ten guilty
than wrongfully convict one innocent.
Nothing in that burden of proof suggests
that the procedure by which we determine whether it has been met should also
be weighted against the government. 2
Indeed, justice Marshall's concurring
opinion in Batson explicitly rejected of
the notion that government peremptories
should be eliminated, based on his

'The only exception is the current asymmetry in the
federal system between prosecution and defense peremptories.
Rule 24(b), Fed. R. Crim. P., permits the government six
peremptories while the defense is permitted ten (except in
capital cases and misdemeanors, where each side receives an
equal number). The existence of this disparity does not justify
any greater disparity. In fact, we have never found a
satisfactory justification for the present asymmetry.

2lf the burden of proof is an asymmetry, then it surely is
important that it carries with it some significant proprosecution asymmetries. These include the right to speak
first to the jury, the right to present evidence first and to rebut
the defendant's evidence if any is offered, and the right to
argue the case to the jury first and last, compared with only
one argument for the defense.
Assuming that the burden of proof is an asymmetry, there
is no evidence that additional asymmetry is necessary to attain
the goal it serves. There is no reason to believe that the current
system wrongfully convicts as many as one innocent person
for every 10 or even 50 that are wrongfully acquitted. Nor is
every incremental increase in the ratio of wrongful acquittals
to wrongful convictions a good thing. There is, after all, a cost
to letting the guilty go free . It is not clear that society would or
should support changes that will increase that cost.

Reply
recognition that both the government
and the defense are entitled to an equally
fair trial: "Our criminal justice system
'requires not only freedom from bias
against the accused, but also from any
prejudice against the prosecution.
Between him and the State the scales are to
be evenly held"' (Batson, 476 U.S. at 107).
Several of Friedman's other examples
of existing asymmetry result directly from
constitutional requirements. For example, he points oufthat the government
must disclose exculpatory evidence, yet
the defense need not disclose inculpatory
evidence. The government's duty to
disclose arises from a desire for accurate
trial results. The goal of accuracy calls for
disclosure of inculpatory evidence as
well, but for the defense, this goal is
preempted by the Fifth Amendment's
protection against self-incrimination.
The same protection gives the defendant
the sole choice of whether or not she will
testify. Similarly, the defense right to
confront witnesses arises directly from
the Sixth Amendment. No similar
constitutional imperative supports the
one-sided right to peremptories.
The defense interest at issue in the
peremptory debate is the right to an
impartial jury of the defendant's peers.
Friedman has not explained how his
proposed new asymmetry is like the
others he cites in that it is somehow
necessary to protect the relevant defense
interest. A defendant's right to an
impartial jury is protected by the process
of voir dire, by challenges for cause and
by the defendant's peremptories. Elimination of the government's peremptories
does not advance any of these defense
interests. Rather, it permits the defense a
greater opportunity to have jurors who
might be biased in its favor. We cannot
understand what the societal interest
might be that is furthered by such an
imbalance.
One benefit of peremptories to the
government, and the main benefit to the
defense, is to eliminate extremists who
might favor the other side. So long as
both sides have them, peremptories are
useless for stacking the jury in one's
favor. This is because each side uses
roughly similar criteria in judging jurors,

and each side uses peremptories to
eliminate those jurors that the other side
would most like to keep. If only one side
had peremptories, it would be much
more possible to stack a jury, instead of
arriving at a jury of moderates.
Although Friedman's article describes
his proposal as moderate, the historical
record suggests otherwise. Prosecution
peremptories were part of the common
law we inherited from the English.
Whether they were called peremptories
or something else, the government's
ability to disqualify jurors predates
defense peremptories. As the Supreme
Court noted in Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. at 219, "the persistence of
peremptories and their extensive use
demonstrate the long and widely held
belief that peremptory challenge is a
necessary part of trial by jury." Abolition
of government peremptories would
reverse the common law rule we inherited from the English,""<ls well as the law
in all 50 states plus the federal system.
This is hardly a moderate proposal.
The government (read "people" or
"society") is entitled to a fair trial by
competent, rational, qualified jurors, just
as the defense is. In the long run, public
acceptance of not guilty verdicts requires
that the public perceive that it has
received a fair trial. A "fair" trial does not
mean a trial that is biased in one's favor.
There is no principled reason for adopting a rule that would decrease the
government's ability to eliminate bias, or
would increase the defendant's ability to
benefit from bias. Society is not well
served by changes that hamper the
government's ability to receive a fair trial.
In our view, eliminating the
government's peremptories would not
only increase the cost of litigation, it
would decrease the fairness to the
government and society without providing the defendant with any justifiable
benefit. Friedman's proposal would also
reverse the well-considered rule of all 50
states, the federal courts, and the common law. We propose instead that the
present rule, which balances the competing interests of society and the accused,
be retained.

way to go. It gives an advocate a blunderbuss, when what is needed is judicial use
of a scalpel. For one thing, most often
prosecutors do not use their
peremptories to remove outliers. Federal
prosecutors ordinarily get six
peremptories; in picking a jury of twelve,
there can't even be that many outliers.
Prosecutors, I believe, use most of their
peremptories the way defense lawyers do
- for comparison shopping.
Furthermore, if a venire member
exhibits characteristics making her
unlikely to be an adequate juror, the trial
judge should be persuadable of that fact.
If the judge - taking into account the
interest that the court and the prosecutor
share in preventing a hung jury - is not
persuaded, why should an advocate's
peremptory contrary desire carry the
day?
So I conclude that, while defense
peremptories are important for reasons
discussed in my earlier essay,
prosecutorial peremptories are not
worthwhile. This leads me to advocate an
asymmetrical solution. Asymmetries in
our rules of criminal justice should not
be adopted out of soft-headed sympathy
for the defendant. Rather, they should be
adopted only when justified by the fact
that the defendant and the prosecution
that seeks to punish him are in asymmetrical positions with respect to the
adjudication. Current law in the federal
courts and in many state systems usually
gives more peremptories to defendants
than to prosecutors. Thus, I do not even
suggest creating a new asymmetry; I
would merely extend one that already
exists.
Friedman's original essay was adapted for
Law Quadrangle Notes from 28 Criminal Law
Bulletin 507 (Nov.-Dec. 1992).
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U.S. Attorney's Office and private
practice in Manhattan, and Deborah
Malamud came to us from a Washington
law firm. Even the AC/DCs are respectful
of lawyers and are deeply interested in
how the law works. I certainly see none
of this distain from our young people."
James Boyd White, the L Hart Wright
Professor of Law, wrote that this sense of
disdain, not theoretical content, makes
some scholarship irrelevant. "It is often
the most theoretical work that will prove
to be of surprising practical value. For
me, the relevant line is not between the
'theoretical' and the 'practical' as Judge
Edwards defines these terms, but between work that manifests interest in,
and respect for, what lawyers and judges
do, and work that does not.
"Often associated with calls for more
'practical' education and writing is an
image of the law as a series of tasks to be
performed more or less correctly, an
image that I think is deeply debilitating.
Leaming to 'read a judicial opinion' is not
a 'skill' to be 'mastered' in the first weeks
of law school, before one gets to the
really important matter of deciding what
kind of society we should have. Leaming

H ow do we legal academics
learn to value and respect work
that is different from our own?
How do we instill in students
and in faculty a sense of
appreciation for what others do,
be it writing about doctrine or
practicing law? How do we get
the academy to practice what it
preaches - that diversity (of
opinion, of style, of thought,
of ethnicity and gender and age,
of scholarship, of work) is
inherently important?
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to read a judicial opinion well and
criticize it intelligently ... is a task for a
lifetime," wrote White, who is also a
professor of English and adjunct professor of classical studies.
Lawyers seldom simply do what's right
or wrong, but make choices in uncertain
circumstances, so their judgment is their
most basic resource. That's why law
should be linked to other disciplines, he
argued. "By its nature, the law is a
discourse that calls upon others. It
creates a space in which other languages
can be heard, their findings and judgments employed. The education of the
lawyer should therefore involve training
in the process of translation, the art by
which the lawyer can learn from other
fields and disciplines, yet at the same
time criticize them."
Clinical professor Paul Reingold
echoed those thoughts in his response.
"Central to (legal practice) is an idea that
is antithetical to academic thinking: that
what matters is not who is right, but
what works. All first-rate practice will
share certain features, but the issue of
'rightness' is literally an academic question. Success outside of the university is
measured not in terms of theoretical
rightness, but in cases or convictions
won, or profits made or policies changed
to favor a client's interest. The successful
practitioner must be open to all sources
of help, from all disciplines. The question
is never who has the more elegant theory,
but which discipline or argument will
work best."
Reingold, director of the U-M's
General Law Clinic, said that to clinical
faculty, the disjunction between legal
education and practice has always been
apparent. He agreed with Edwards that
much legal scholarship today has become
so theoretical that it has little to offer
practicing lawyers, judges or legislators.
Like Edwards, he points out that the
interdisciplinary movement that has
broadened the scope of legal education
has paradoxically made it less diverse in
some ways.

Faculties of theorists are replicating
themselves, hiring like-minded scholars
and granting tenure to those who
demonstrate prowess with legal theory.
Theorists are the academic meritocracy;
traditional doctrinal scholars are the
equivalent of "solid B students," and
practitioners not inclined toward theory
are viewed as "a rung down the intellectual ladder." Reingold called for tolerance, diversity and increased emphasis
on clinical legal education to balance the
trend. He wrote:
"How do we legal academics learn to
value and respect work that is different
from our own? How do we instill in
students and in faculty a sense of appreciation for what others do, be it writing
about doctrine or practicing law? How do
we get the academy to practice what it
preaches - that diversity (of opinion, of
style, of thought, of ethnicity and gender
and age, of scholarship, of work) is
inherently important?
"In my view, clinical legal education
may well provide an answer. When
clinical legal education is integrated fully
into the law school curriculum, then
theory and practice have a chance to
merge. This is not to say that theory
should play a lesser role than it does
now, but theory would be regarded
differently for having to compete daily
with the issues of doctrine, procedure,
policy, strategy, ethics, and business and
personal skills that are more important to
lawyers.
"Theory may have overtaken doctrine
at the 'elite' schools, but Judge Edwards
is still right that the best legal education
will have to include doctrine, theory,
clinical instruction and probably something from a range of other disciplines as
well, in order to cover all the bases."

